Posted originally on Aug 10, 2026 by Martin Armstrong |

Governments do not spend years planning nationwide crisis simulations for events they consider impossible. They prepare for scenarios they increasingly believe are plausible. That is what caught my attention about the latest report from Politico Europe. France is reportedly organizing a nationwide tabletop exercise in the second half of 2027 to simulate a catastrophic electrical blackout involving the military, multiple ministries, and the operators of the national power grid. The purpose is to determine how long it would take to restore electricity while maintaining the continuity of the state itself.
This is no longer merely about restoring electricity. The planning documents reportedly focus on preserving “the continuity of the state” and ensuring access to generators, medicines, telecommunications equipment, emergency supplies, law enforcement equipment, and even critical raw materials. Governments only begin making lists like that when they are thinking beyond a temporary inconvenience and toward systemic disruption.
Officials point to several justifications. They cite the massive Spain-Portugal blackout of 2025, cyberattacks against European infrastructure, record-breaking heat, devastating wildfires, and the growing vulnerability of modern electrical grids. Every one of those concerns is legitimate on its own. The problem is that when you begin stacking one crisis upon another, governments naturally begin expanding emergency powers and contingency planning.
People have a dangerous habit of assuming the lights will always come back on. Modern civilization exists because electricity exists. Remove power for several days and grocery stores cannot replenish food. Fuel pumps stop operating. Telecommunications become unreliable. Banking systems slow or cease functioning. ATMs run dry. Water treatment plants struggle. Hospitals switch to backup generators that themselves depend on fuel deliveries. Supply chains that operate with almost no inventory begin breaking down in a matter of days.
Europe has spent years aggressively restructuring its energy system while simultaneously increasing dependence upon digital infrastructure. The more sophisticated society becomes, the more vulnerable it also becomes. Every layer of technology creates another potential point of failure. Whether the cause is cyber warfare, sabotage, cascading technical failures, terrorism, or extreme weather, the result is the same. Society quickly discovers that modern life is built upon assumptions of uninterrupted power.
What interests me most is the timing. Why 2027? Governments generally react to past crises. They seldom dedicate enormous resources preparing for hypothetical national emergencies unless they believe the probability is no longer remote. France is not simply planning another emergency exercise. According to the reporting, this scenario involves the military, energy operators, ministries, and national resilience planners asking how the French state itself would continue functioning during a prolonged nationwide blackout. That is a very different exercise than preparing for a hurricane or localized storm.
Perhaps one should also ask why so many Western governments are simultaneously expanding civil defense programs, encouraging emergency stockpiles, strengthening critical infrastructure planning, and discussing resilience with increasing urgency. These initiatives are emerging across Europe, not in isolation.
Governments rarely invest this much time preparing for events they consider unlikely. Perhaps the most important question is not whether France can survive a blackout simulation. The real question is why European governments increasingly believe these scenarios deserve national rehearsals. When governments begin preparing for the unimaginable, history suggests the unimaginable has often moved much closer than the public realizes.