Posted originally on Jun 22, 2025 by Martin Armstrong 

QUESTION: I understand you rely on the computer. The forecasts are not your opinion, and that is what makes you stand out among all the talking heads. What is your personal opinion? Do you think that if Trump had given diplomacy a chance, it would have worked, or was this inevitable?

FS

ANSWER: Looking at the computer, I could not see any other outcome. I do believe that Trump acted thinking that this would end the war and the terrorism of Iran. His mistake is judging Iran by what a rational state would typically do. Iran is a theocracy, and its government is driven by entrenched ideas that I do not see changing.

The differing stances towards Israel between many Shia-majority actors (notably Iran and its allies) and some Sunni-led states stem from a complex mix of religious, geopolitical, strategic, and ideological factors, rather than a fundamental theological difference between Shia and Sunni Islam regarding Palestine itself.

The 1979 Iranian Revolution established an Islamic Republic with a strong anti-Western and anti-imperialist ideology. Opposition to Israel (“The Little Satan”) became a core pillar of its revolutionary identity and foreign policy, framing it as a colonial implant, an extension of Western (particularly US) imperialism in the Middle East, and an oppressor of Palestinians.

The Iranian Revolution exported ideology and identity. Championing the Palestinian cause became central to Iran’s self-proclaimed leadership of the Muslim world (“Resistance Axis“) against Western influence and its regional rivals. Iran sees Israel as its primary regional adversary and a major strategic threat, closely aligned with its arch-rival, the United States, and Sunni powers like Saudi Arabia (historically).

Supporting anti-Israel groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Gaza, and various Shia militias in Iraq and Syria became the key geopolitical tool for Iran. It projects power and influence far beyond its borders. This established a network of proxies to deter Israeli or US attacks on Iran. This is what I mean about religious issues, for it challenges the regional order dominated by the US and its Sunni allies. This “Axis of Resistance” is fundamentally built on opposition to Israel and the US.

We must comprehend that for Iran and its Shia allies, unwavering support for the Palestinian struggle against Israel is a source of domestic legitimacy and a way to claim leadership of the broader Muslim world, transcending sectarian divides. Portraying Sunni states that normalize relations as traitors to the cause reinforces this narrative. It remains to be seen if the Shia will instigate civil unrest within the Sunni states like Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia.

There are significant differences in Sunni approaches (pragmatism and shifting alliances) compared to those of the Shia (confrontation).

Some Sunni-led states (UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, Sudan) normalized relations with Israel based on pragmatic national interests, not theological shifts. They have a shared perception of Iran as the primary threat (especially for Gulf states). They are far more practical in terms of access to technology, trade, investment, and tourism. They also gained US favor, breaking diplomatic isolation. They have believed that engagement might yield better results than a boycott or prioritizing other concerns over it. Israel’s attacks on unarmed Palestinians in Gaza threaten that practical view.

It’s crucial to remember that Sunni Islam and Sunni-majority states are not monolithic. Many Sunni populations remain deeply opposed to normalization. Countries like Qatar maintain relations with Hamas but not Israel. Turkey has diplomatic relations but remains highly critical. Jordan and Egypt have peace treaties, but experience significant public opposition and cold relations.

Then there is the risk of state versus non-state actors. Established Sunni states often prioritize state sovereignty, stability, and economic interests. Non-state Sunni actors like Hamas or the Muslim Brotherhood frequently maintain hardline stances closer to Iran’s position (Hamas is part of the Resistance Axis).

Both Shia and Sunni Muslims revere Jerusalem (Al-Quds) as the third-holiest site in Islam. The Palestinian cause resonates deeply on religious grounds across the Muslim world. The difference lies in strategic emphasis. For Iran and its allies, opposing Israel is the central rallying cry and geopolitical strategy. For some Sunni states, while the religious significance remains, it competes with other pressing security and economic priorities in their foreign policy calculus. Iran weaponizes this perceived prioritization to criticize Sunni leaders.

Consequently, Shia opposition (Iran-led Axis) is primarily driven by revolutionary ideology, geopolitical strategy (countering the US/Israel/Saudi axis), regional ambitions, and the use of the Palestinian cause as a tool for legitimacy and proxy warfare. It’s a core part of their identity and foreign policy. This is why I personally am not optimistic, and I fear that Israel may stupidly think assassinating the Supreme Leader will end Iran, and it will return to the days of the pre-1979 Revolution. They put at risk the entire pragmatic national interests of the Sunni States that can see internal strife in response to such an action on top of the hard treatment of Palestinian civilians in Gaza. This can result in shifting regional dynamics that I am deeply concerned about. There is no religious Sunni theological shift on the importance of Jerusalem or Palestinian rights, and it faces significant public opposition within those countries.

The divergence is less about a fundamental Shia vs. Sunni theological difference on Palestine/Israel, and more about differing geopolitical strategies, national interests, and ideological priorities between the Iranian-led “Resistance Axis” and certain Sunni-led Arab states seeking new alliances and security arrangements in a changing Middle East. Iran uses maximalist opposition to Israel as its defining strategy, while some Sunni states have decided engagement serves their interests better, given the perceived greater threat from Iran.

I am not sure that there are people who understand this in the leadership of Israel or the United States. The huge mistake here is assuming that this strike will cause the Shia to throw down their arms and adopt the Sunni pragmatic position. I do not see that sort of religious upheaval.